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The New Federal Corporation Law? 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
Professor Robert Ahdieh offers to reinterpret the debate over whether 
state competition for corporate charters leads to more or less optimal 
results—a race to the top or bottom.1  He presents the more modest stances 
taken by the debate’s titans, William Cary and Ralph Winter, and suggests 
narrower differences between them than appeared in later literature.2  
Referring to this “race debate” as “the starting point for the study of 
corporate law,”3 Professor Ahdieh opines that the literature overvalues state 
charter competition for corporate governance and underappreciates 
advancing corporation law’s normative end to address the costs of 
separation of ownership from control in the modern public corporation.4 
The original race debate highlighted two competitive patterns: one 
among states to attract charters and another among managers to attract 
capital.5  In the literature, a tendency to conflate arose, Professor Ahdieh 
says, in a logical misfire of the following form: states compete to promote 
managerial interests and managers compete to promote shareholder 
interests, ergo states compete to promote shareholder interests.6  Professor 
Ahdieh reverses the misfire to look separately at the two competitive 
patterns and gets a different picture.7  State competition may have 
something to do with resulting corporate laws, he says, but managerial 
competition for capital determines corporate governance, and that is driven 
by markets, not states.8  State competition’s main role, Professor Ahdieh 
concurs with Professor Jonathan Macey and others, is to control regulatory 
excesses that states may otherwise impose on corporations.9 
This reversal carries implications for several discussions, including 
federal preemption of state corporation law.  In Professor Ahdieh’s 
retelling, proponents of federal preemption, concerned about a state race to 
the bottom, may miss the mark; opponents of federal preemption, believing 
 
 * Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law, The George Washington 
University Law School. 
 1 Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism 
for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 255 (2009). 
 2 Id. at 256–57. 
 3 Id. at 257. 
 4 Id. at 257–58, 265, 292. 
 5 Id. at 257. 
 6 See id. at 257–58. 
 7 See id. 
 8 Id. at 258. 
 9 See id. at 258, 283 (noting scholarship produced by Henry Manne, William Carney, 
Jonathan Macey and David Haddock, and Susan Phillips and Richard Zecher). 
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states race to the top, may understate preemption’s potential value.10  The 
reversal certainly means that one cannot simply say that federal regulation 
of corporations is inefficient because it is federal.11  The current set of 
institutional design choices, giving roles to both state and federal regulation 
for public corporations, may be optimal, but cannot be presumed, Professor 
Ahdieh concludes.12  The prescriptive upshot is to replace talk of racing to 
the top or bottom with a framework that links institutional design choices 
to stated objectives.13 
In this Comment on Professor Ahdieh’s article, several threshold 
quarrels concern what may be perceived as some overstatement in the 
piece.  First, it is not obvious that the question of state charter competition 
is the starting point for the study of corporation law.14  Second, the article 
may overstate how often or seriously scholars make or take assertions 
about federal corporation law being presumptively inefficient or that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act15 is automatically suboptimal because it is a federal 
rather than a state statute.16  Third, although the article suggests that it is 
inaugurating a conversation, discourse transcending the race debate has 
been ongoing for some time.17  Fourth, one may question assertions that 
there is a lack of topics for discussion in corporation law18 or a lack of 
scholarship addressing the mechanisms and roles of markets in corporate 
practice and governance.19 
These objections aside, what is new in the article is a crystallization of 
the importance of institutional design.  Professor Ahdieh may be right 
about the need for greater attention to questions of institutional design in 
corporate law scholarship.20  In particular, an interesting argument holds 
that there is nothing inevitable about the characteristics of federal 
corporation law that should be feared by devotees of state corporation law 
 
 10 See id. at 259–60, 281, 290–91. 
 11 See id. at 260. 
 12 Id. at 260–61, 297. 
 13 Id. at 260–61, 304–05. 
 14 Rivals include the nature of the firm, private contract versus social control, agency 
theory, shareholder-manager relations, limited liability, and the internal affairs doctrine.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 92–94. 
 15 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 16 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 260, 296–97; infra text accompanying notes 80–84. 
 17 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 
U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 401 (1994); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the 
Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 627–28 (2004). 
 18 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 290, 296–97, 305; infra text accompanying notes 95–
96. 
 19 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 260, 267–68, 273, 304; infra text accompanying notes 
86–90. 
 20 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 306. 
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production.21 
First, Professor Ahdieh argues, federal corporation law may assume a 
form that is just as enabling as state corporation law22—a characteristic of 
state corporation law that many devotees prize as a singular virtue.23  
Second, despite concern about the costs of regulatory monopoly that could 
result from federal corporation law,24 Professor Ahdieh argues that state 
regulatory competition is primarily about regulating regulators, something 
federal preemption would also require.25  The issue is the comparative costs 
of regulatory excess in the two design choices.26 
The following analysis first reviews Professor Ahdieh’s corrective 
account of the state competition debate and its identification of what is 
significant about that competition (regulating the regulators).  It critiques 
discussion of implications for federal corporation law that Professor 
Ahdieh highlights as among the most significant subjects to which his 
article contributes, challenging some grounds for supposing that federal 
corporation law would be enabling and detailing the larger quarrels referred 
to above. 
Nevertheless, this analysis then takes up Professor Ahdieh’s implicit 
invitation to meditate on the possible form that federal corporation law may 
plausibly assume.  This discussion suggests that, despite longstanding 
evidence, beliefs, and prescriptions to the contrary, it is possible to imagine 
federal corporation law that is enabling.  Recent deregulatory proposals by 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury Department”) in cognate 
fields suggest examples of how this could work, involving consolidation of 
regulatory power in the federal government and substantial delegation of 
that power to self-regulatory organizations, especially stock exchanges.27  
In turn, this deregulatory stance may be sustained when one considers that 
Washington’s regulatory monopoly in securities regulation may be ending 
amid globalization because numerous other national regulators and 
exchanges now compete with the United States. 
One practical result of global regulatory competition is that market-
driven regulation of the regulators becomes stronger.  A contending 
 
 21 See id. at 297. 
 22 Id. at 270–71, 293–96. 
 23 See id. at 293 & n.151. 
 24 Id. at 293–96. 
 25 Id. at 294–95. 
 26 Id. at 260. 
 27 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A 
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 5–22 (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf. 
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academic result is that opponents of regulatory competition, concerned that 
it ratchets quality regulation down, may not embrace that competition 
either.  For them, amid capital market globalization, search for a form of 
transnational consolidated supervisor may be necessary—precisely to 
provide mandatory, rather than enabling, regulations.  The state corporation 
law race debate that Professor Ahdieh opposes may simply be replayed as 
an international securities regulation race debate.  Ultimately, however, 
political realities accompanying the 2008–09 global economic crisis, 
revealing both market failure and regulatory weakness, do not create an 
auspicious time for such deregulatory reform.  Proposals presented as 
alternatives to the Treasury Department’s suggest just such a search for 
international regulatory consolidation.28  Yet, just as Professor Adhieh 
emphasizes, reform discussions—whatever shape they take—should 
engage with questions of institutional design. 
I. Account and Critique 
Professor Ahdieh reviews the prevailing model that links the 
institutional design of state competition to concern about the separation of 
ownership and control.29  Some declare that state competition puts limits on 
managers that result in protecting shareholder interests.  This stance has its 
origins in responses to William Cary’s claim that states, coveting franchise 
fees, cater to managers, not shareholders, and offer greater managerial 
discretion at shareholder expense.30  Ralph Winter’s response to Cary 
acknowledged this risk but explained that market forces constrain managers 
to promote shareholder interests.31 
The implication was that the agency cost problem of separation of 
ownership from control is addressed by markets, not state competition.32  
Yet Winter’s scholarly successors took him to say that state competition 
negates Cary’s claim because it addresses agency costs and promotes a race 
to the top, not to the bottom, Professor Ahdieh says.33  Scholars thus 
“transmuted” a negative point into an affirmative one: Winter said Cary 
was wrong to predict a race to the bottom, because of market forces; 
Winter did not say the result would be a race to the top.34 
Professor Ahdieh accordingly recasts the Cary-Winter debate in this 
 
 28 See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 17–18, 21 (2009) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT], available at 
http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf. 
 29 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 256–58. 
 30 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–70 (1974). 
 31 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254–62 (1977). 
 32 See id. at 256. 
 33 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 262–63, 266–67. 
 34 Id. at 266–67. 
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bifurcated competition model to reveal that state competition offers limited 
implications for corporate governance, despite how the received story 
makes state competition its engine.35  Even if the race talk is just 
convenient shorthand, Professor Ahdieh notes, it has had profound 
effects.36  Significant counter-implications come from amplifying the 
distinct competitive patterns, especially concerning exactly what 
contribution state competition makes.37  Once managerial market forces are 
highlighted, they appear as the main devices to pursue corporation law’s 
normative ends addressing separation of ownership from control.38 
Professor Ahdieh explains that the actual role of state charter 
competition is to regulate the regulators—to address the relationship 
between the corporation (shareholders and managers included) and the 
state.39  Managerial competition’s goal is to promote corporation law’s 
normative ends, orbiting around agency cost control within the corporation 
between managers and shareholders.40  The two competitions are related, so 
that state competition that constrains regulators can indirectly lower costs 
to managers of promoting shareholder interests.41  But the ends remain 
distinct.42 
State competition aligns state regulatory interests with managerial 
demand as a response to that demand.43  It cannot supply good 
governance.44  If managers demand weak rules, states will efficiently 
produce them.45  Emphasizing managerial competition as the driver of 
governance quality implies that one could reach identical substantive 
results in a regime of multiple-state corporation laws or exclusive federal 
corporation law.46  So defining the different objectives requires recognizing 
that there are alternative ways to design institutions to advance them, which 
may mean that the optimal corporation law choice is multiple-state, 
exclusive federal, or a combination.47 
Federal corporation law is thus among the subjects that Professor 
 
 35 See id. at 267 
 36 Id. at 268. 
 37 See id. at 268–69. 
 38 See id. at 269, 273, 281–82. 
 39 Id. at 281. 
 40 Id. at 258, 273, 281–82. 
 41 See id. at 268, 273. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. at 281–82. 
 44 Id. at 273. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. at 285–86. 
 47 Id. at 296–98. 
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Ahdieh highlights as implicated by his analysis.48  The standard account 
that state competition drives optimal law and governance hides how 
efficient regulation can result without it.49  Federalism is an institutional 
design choice, not the inexorable result of a drive to efficient regulation.50  
That means that federal corporation law could be efficient too.51  If 
managerial competition drives state regulation to optimality, then it could 
equally drive federal law to optimality.52 
Professor Ahdieh acknowledges that vital to these assertions is that 
resulting federal law be characterized by the same enabling element typical 
of state corporation law.53  He observes that the standard account is that 
state competition led to enabling corporation law.54  But he notes that he is 
“unsure this is correct” and provides reasons for this uncertainty.55  He then 
suggests, however, that even if it is correct, it remains possible that federal 
law could be enabling even without any analogue to state competition.56  
Predicting the probable form (and content) of federal corporation law is 
facilitated by taking a rational-choice approach to federal regulation.57  
That approach does not necessarily mean that federal law must be 
mandatory—it could be enabling so that corporations continue to have 
flexibility in tailoring general law to particular needs.58 
The issue becomes one of the prospects of regulatory capture of 
federal authorities, Professor Ahdieh says.59  Managers, amid competition 
driving them to demand laws favoring shareholder interests, would demand 
a federal corporation law that does so too, which should as likely be 
enabling as mandatory.60  Managerial interests, aligned with shareholder 
interests, would not be offset by any contending interest group, Professor 
Ahdieh supposes.61 
Professor Ahdieh recognizes that the political economy in Washington 
may be more complex than that prevailing in the states.62  Congress may 
face more competing demands than Delaware, for example, to give 
 
 48 See id. at 260–61, 296–98. 
 49 Id. at 272–73. 
 50 Id. at 260–61, 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 260–61, 296–98. 
 53 Id. at 293–96. 
 54 Id. at 292–94; see also infra text accompanying notes 113–114. 
 55 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 294. 
 56 See id. at 295–96. 
 57 See id. at 296–98. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 294. 
 60 Id. at 294–95. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. at 295–96. 
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corporation law requisite attention.63  Yet not much time is required, 
Professor Ahdieh observes, especially if manager-shareholder interests 
really are substantially aligned, as the conventional model assumes.64 
These assertions trigger two substantive criticisms.  First, Professor 
Ahdieh challenges much of, but not all, the conventional model.  He 
challenges conventional state competition stories by explaining that state 
competition does not really address agency costs, but he accepts 
conventional stories that managerial market competition is about agency 
costs and works, at least in the sense that managerial and shareholder 
interests are substantially aligned.65  But why should that assumption from 
convention be accepted?  It seems as much susceptible to challenge as the 
state competition claim, and Professor Ahdieh’s discussion of state 
antitakeover statutes66 suggests reasons to doubt its plausibility. 
Second, Professor Ahdieh rightly takes a cautious approach to this 
discussion, only challenging any assumption that federal corporation law 
would necessarily be more mandatory than enabling or questioning why it 
would never be flexible, given managerial competition and managerial 
promotion of shareholder interests.67  This is a shrewd allocation of the 
burden of proof.  After all, it is not possible to prove what character any 
federal corporation law would have.  If all that is required to ease its 
opponents’ fears is that federal corporation law could be enabling, the 
article proves a good case.  But if one requires firmer evidence of likely 
form, skeptics may be unmoved. 
Professor Ahdieh does implicitly acknowledge that the Washington 
environment is more complex than state environments,68 but this discussion 
also warrants a critical read.  That environment would include interest 
groups lobbying on behalf of such constituencies as consumers, lenders, 
employees, and even the environment.  Professor Ahdieh suggests that 
similar complexities may exist at the state level and suggests corporation 
law’s occasional indeterminacy as evidence.69 
But this discussion may insufficiently appreciate how state corporation 
law is primarily about manager-shareholder relations.  Aside from the 
extraordinary case of the small subgroup of antitakeover statutes reflecting 
the interests of other constituencies, those other constituencies do their 
 
 63 Id. at 296 
 64 Id. 
 65 See supra text accompanying notes 39–46. 
 66 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 299–302. 
 67 See supra text accompanying notes 43–47. 
 68 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 295–96. 
 69 Id. at 296. 
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bidding in Washington.  They lobby for laws imposed on corporations 
through other fields of law, such as antitrust, bankruptcy, labor, tax, and 
environmental law. 
If the portion of corporation law addressing primarily managers and 
shareholders were produced in Washington, those other interests would 
come into direct play and into more direct political conflict.  Professor 
Ahdieh works through this interest group complexity analysis solely to 
address and to dismiss as trivial any concern over whether Washington will 
pay sufficient attention to corporation law.70  Washington would find the 
time, no doubt.  But he leaves it for later to explore how the laws likely 
could look in the resulting hurly-burly. 
Certainly, federal corporation laws could look more mandatory than 
enabling given the more complete and complex interest-group picture.  
Supporting that prediction are the mandatory character of many historical 
proposals for a federal corporation law,71 much of traditional federal 
securities regulation, and most of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.72  Reinforcing that prediction are express preferences that advocates of 
federal corporation law have shown for precisely a mandatory body of rules 
to overcome perceived weaknesses in the enabling character of most state 
corporation law.73 
A potentially larger objection to a federal corporation law, Professor 
Ahdieh notes, is that such a regulatory monopolist in corporation law could 
increase rent extraction.74  But he says it is not obvious that Congress or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) would operate that way, 
given limited evidence of having done so in the past in areas of corporate 
affairs that they have regulated.75  Again, however, that occurred in an 
environment where prevailing and historical political realities held that 
states have power to compete. 
On this contestable terrain, Professor Ahdieh cautiously emphasizes 
that one need not take a firm stance on the question of whether federal 
corporation law would more likely reflect a mandatory versus enabling 
character.76  Again shrewdly allocating the burden of proof, Professor 
Ahdieh says it is enough to observe that this line of analysis leads to a 
different and potentially more productive discourse than the line of analysis 
that sees state competition as the driver of corporate governance.77  
 
 70 See id. 
 71 See E. Merrick Dodd, Federal Corporation Act, 53 YALE L.J. 812, 813 (1944) 
(noting that early proposals for federal corporation law were “compulsory”). 
 72 See infra text accompanying notes 106–135. 
 73 See Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 
MD. L. REV. 947, 947–49, 971–74 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 106–108. 
 74 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 296. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. at 297. 
 77 See id. 
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Professor Ahdieh instances how some say any federal corporation laws, 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are bad precisely because they are 
federal.78  He argues that once the distinct functions of the two 
competitions are clarified, analysis must examine content on the merits, 
whether coming from Washington or Delaware.79 
These assertions prompt interpretive criticisms concerning Professor 
Ahdieh’s characterizations of the literature and prescriptions for its 
direction.  The advice to put merits first seems self-evidently wise.  It leads 
one to wonder whether scholars have ignored the substantive content of 
state versus federal law in favor of simple declarations like state 
corporation law must be better than federal corporation law (or vice versa).  
This does not seem obvious.  True, Professor Ahdieh is in good company in 
lamenting a tendency, at least among a group of scholars, to “fulminate[]” 
over federal incursions into corporation law shown in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.80  But it may be overstated to say that scholars generally, or the 
literature taken as a whole, do that. 
Many analyses of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act engage directly with its 
substantive merits, some evaluating the provisions sequentially,81 others 
highlighting particular provisions.82  Even scholars known to oppose 
federal corporation law analyzed the substance and character of particular 
provisions.83  Such engagement with the appropriate content balance 
between state and federal regulation seems quite common.84  Accordingly, 
 
 78 Id. at 260, 297. 
 79 See id. at 297. 
 80 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the 
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009). 
 81 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, 
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 974–77 (2003). 
 82 See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB 
and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977–78, 980 (2005); Michael A. 
Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 672, 674 (2002). 
 83 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 349–55 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 
86–90 (2003). 
 84 See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: 
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 233 
(1999).  Similar confrontations occur in related fields, such as insurance and banking.  See, 
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: 
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 20 (1993); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis, 77 
IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1105–08 (1992); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to 
Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994–97 (1992). 
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Professor Ahdieh’s prescription for scholars to engage in specific debates 
over what is optimal to reduce agency costs, rather than general debates of 
state versus federal law,85 seems both sound and already taken. 
Similarly, it seems self-evident that participants cannot assume or 
deduce from capital market efficiency any particular institutional design 
choice, since managerial capital market competition and state charter 
competition do different things.  Professor Ahdieh observes that one can 
believe in efficient capital markets and still support federal corporation 
law; one can be skeptical of efficient capital markets and still prefer state 
corporation law.86  The issue is relative capital market efficiency and 
strength.87  Professor Ahdieh’s prescription for scholars to study 
mechanisms and limits of informational efficiency in capital markets thus 
likewise seems sound.88  Again, however, this work has been undertaken 
extensively in the scholarly literature89 and enjoys a visible place in 
resulting teaching materials.90 
Nor is it obvious that the question of state charter competition is the 
“starting point” for the study of corporation law that Professor Ahdieh says 
it is.91  Rivals include the nature of the firm, private contract versus social 
control, agency theory, shareholder-manager relations, limited liability, and 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Similarly, it may not be fair to say, as 
Professor Ahdieh does, that federalism and state competition are 
corporation law’s “central questions”92 or certainly that the literature is 
“single-minded” about these.93 
Scores of issues in corporation law discourse have little or nothing to 
do with federalism or state competition, revealed in many syllabi for the 
corporations course and casebook tables of contents.94  This also makes one 
 
 85 See supra text accompanying notes 77–79. 
 86 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 305. 
 87 See id. at 303–04 
 88 See id. 
 89 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The 
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 
547–48 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1541 (2007); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient 
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 765 (1985). 
 90 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 6–
38 (6th ed. 2008); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 195–
203 (6th ed. 2004); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS FOR AN ADVANCED COURSE IN CORPORATIONS 221–275 
(3d ed. 2006); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 204–206 (2006). 
 91 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 257. 
 92 Id. at 261. 
 93 Id. at 297 n.164, 305. 
 94 See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
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question the article’s assertions that there is a lack of topics for discussion 
in corporation law95 and possibly to bristle at some of the article’s 
ungenerous characterizations of corporate law scholarship.96 
Still, it does seem desirable to dislodge any absolutist or binary top-
bottom framing in favor of attention to institutional complexity, as 
Professor Ahdieh recommends.97  It seems particularly desirable to 
consider Professor Ahdieh’s ultimate point that the importance of 
institutional design in corporation law may receive too little attention.98  
More granular studies of federalism’s effects might be useful, as Professor 
Ahdieh concludes, to decide which institutions are better at what.99  The 
following discussion accepts a modified form of Professor Ahdieh’s 
invitation. 
II. Federal Corporation Law’s Potential Character 
Professor Ahdieh suggests there is nothing inevitable about a federal 
corporation law’s character along the spectrum from mandatory to 
enabling.100  It is worth noting that the mandatory-enabling distinction, 
although often critical to the state-federal debate, is not the only one 
relevant to opponents of federal corporation law.  Others, in addition to 
concerns about regulatory monopoly, include fears that it would be heavy 
with rules, not principles-oriented, and too regulatory rather than 
deferential.101  To imagine the form of federal corporation law in those 
terms, first consider traditional suppositions and inferential evidence 
tending to support conventional suspicion, which Professor Ahdieh 
implicitly critiques, and then more contemporary proposals and 
implications that support the contrary possibility, which Professor Ahdieh 
says we should consider. 
 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS xvi–xxvi (6th ed. 2005) (listing the 
following topics in the table of contents that have little or nothing to do with federalism or 
state competition: limited liability and veil piercing, capitalization and dividends, 
oppression, cumulative voting, fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders, 
changes in control, and derivative litigation and indemnification).  By comparison, the 
foregoing casebook devotes a total of six pages to the “race” issue, emphasizing the 
substantial congruence of corporation law across states.  See id. at 19–20, 227–30. 
 95 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 290, 297, 305. 
 96 See, e.g., id. at 270–72, 302–03. 
 97 See id. at 281, 302–03, 306–07. 
 98 See id. at 260–61, 297–98, 305–06. 
 99 See id. at 297–98, 306–07. 
 100 See supra text accompanying notes 22, 53–64. 
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A. Old Federal Corporation and Securities Law 
There may be only limited historical grounds to accept the possibility 
that a federal corporation law could be enabling.  Since the 1940s, 
proposals for and drafts of a federal corporation act have existed.102  One of 
the first, drawn directly from the Illinois state corporation statute, was 
explicitly enabling.103  Today’s Model Business Corporation Act (“Model 
Act”) traces its lineage to early proposals for a federal corporation act.104  
Most, though not all, of the content of the original versions, and of today’s 
Model Act, epitomize the enabling character of state corporation law.105 
On the other hand, some versions of proposals for the Model Act were 
rejected as too restrictive—too mandatory, i.e., not enabling—and these 
were often prepared with a view toward fighting off federal preemption 
efforts.106  In addition, federalism issues were implicated in debate leading 
to promulgation of the American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance 
Code, in which many detect a more mandatory than enabling character.107  
It also is true that many advocates of federal corporation law exhibit 
commitment to a more stringent, mandatory system of regulation.108 
Furthermore, many scholars and judges promote Delaware corporation 
law as “principles-based,” especially when contrasting it with federal 
securities regulation, which they allege to be “rules-based.”109  Others 
believe that the purpose of the asserted rules-density of federal securities 
regulation is precisely to overcome deficiencies of state corporation law’s 
perceived penchant for principles.110  Although there is reason to question 
the clarity of these classifications,111 discussions suggest an appetite among 
devotees of federal corporation law for rules whereas proponents of state 
corporation law tend to prefer principles.112 
 
 102 See Thompson, supra note 84, at 223. 
 103 See Dodd, supra note 71, at 812, 818. 
 104 See Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 
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 105 See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 453, 453–54 (1997) (noting that although the Model Act includes some mandatory 
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 108 See Seligman, supra note 73, at 949, 971–74. 
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Accordingly, there is at least some inferential, experience-based reason 
for opponents of federal corporation law to assume that it would adopt a 
more mandatory and rule-like character than laws that states have 
produced.  In addition, the evidence is reasonably strong that the enabling 
quality of state corporation law is traceable to competition among the 
states,113 and that the use of principles promoted a state’s position in the 
competition.114  By contrast, the absence of competitors to a federalized 
business regulation system may impair the federal institutional capacity to 
generate laws bearing such qualities.  Regulatory monopoly can lead more 
nearly to mandatory than enabling laws, especially when regulators extract 
rents by imposing excessive regulation on corporations. 
It may also be difficult to identify much in existing federal securities 
regulation that is more enabling than mandatory.  Certainly this is so of its 
most important element, the mandatory disclosure system.  Critics 
complain that this mandatory system is unnecessary and costly, and 
contend that, absent regulation, a voluntary disclosure system would exist 
and serve better.115 
True, some provisions of federal securities regulation are optional and 
many exhibit principle-like qualities rather than rule-like qualities.116  But 
by and large the laws tend to be mandatory and many bear characteristics 
of rules.117  These features may be particularly evident in subjects, 
including, as examples, the regulation of broker-dealers and much of 
federal law addressing insider trading,118 that traditionally had been 
classified as within state corporation law rather than federal securities 
regulation.119  Accordingly, historical and prevailing securities regulation 
may tend to support the suspicion that a federal corporation law would bear 
characteristics more nearly regulatory than deferential, at least when 
compared to existing state corporation law. 
Similar inferences may be drawn from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
receptions to it.  The Act preempted several areas of corporation law 
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traditionally handled by states.120  Most of its provisions are mandatory,121 
including rules addressing board audit committees and corporate internal 
controls and rules prescribing specific required or prohibited activities of 
corporate officers, directors, and board committee members,122 as well as 
securities lawyers123 and securities analysts.124  They even create specific 
federal derivative lawsuits.125  They also dictate what auditors must do126 
and how both auditing standard setters127 and accounting standard setters128 
are to be organized. 
Only a few of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s hundreds of provisions may 
be classified as enabling.  One is the provision concerning financial 
expertise on audit committees.129  It assumes the have-or-disclose 
approach: either a company has a financial expert on the committee or, if 
not, must explain why not.130  A second is the similar approach taken to 
whether a company adopts a code of business ethics.  The Act required the 
SEC to promulgate regulations requiring public disclosure of whether a 
company has a code of ethics for senior officers and, if not, the reason why 
not.131 
In addition to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s largely mandatory content 
supporting suspicion that federal corporation law would assume a similar 
form, one may infer from scholarly receptivity to the Act additional 
grounds for that suspicion.  For example, many scholars who are 
antagonistic to the Act also tend to oppose federal corporation law 
generally132 and vice versa.133  Critics complained about not only the 
mandatory nature of the Act, but about its “suffocating” regulatory 
characteristics.134  Others complained of its rules-density.135  Accordingly, 
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it does not seem irresponsible to conclude that there is a good basis for 
predicting, contrary to Professor Adhieh’s hypothesis, that federal 
corporation law would more likely exhibit a mandatory, rules-heavy 
orientation rather than the enabling, principles orientation of traditional 
state corporation law. 
B. New Federal Corporate Regulation 
All that may change amid capital market globalization and in light of 
some recent proposals to reform the U.S. financial regulation system.  In 
contrast to older conceptions of federal corporation law or securities 
regulation, readily imaginable proposals envision an enabling, and 
generally deregulatory, federal corporation law—and indeed such a federal 
securities regulation. 
Consider the Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Regulatory Structure (“Treasury Blueprint”).136  Inspired initially 
by concern about declining U.S. capital market competiveness,137 it was 
revised and presented as a response to the global financial crisis that 
manifested in March 2008.138  The Treasury Blueprint proposes a radical 
reorganization and consolidation of regulatory power in the U.S. federal 
government, but then imagines adopting provisions that may best be 
characterized as more enabling than mandatory, more principles-rich than 
rules-heavy, and more supervisory than regulatory.139  It also imagines 
delegating this power to self-regulatory organizations, especially stock 
exchanges.140 
Particularly illuminating is the Treasury Blueprint’s proposal to merge 
securities and futures regulation, which includes combining the SEC and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).141  The Treasury 
Blueprint describes the agencies as using differing regulatory philosophies, 
making clear that it prefers the CFTC’s to the SEC’s and that a uniting of 
the agencies should result in a surviving entity and output more like the 
 
what can be a suffocatingly complex regulatory environment”). 
 135 See Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 ACCT. 
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former than the latter.142  All cut in favor of looser rather than stricter 
imposition, as three philosophical examples suggest. 
First, the Treasury Blueprint says that the CFTC uses a “principles-
based regulatory philosophy” and announces that it has characteristic 
“market benefits” worth preserving in the futures area and expanding into 
the securities area.143  It refers to this migration as a method to “modernize 
the SEC’s regulatory approach.”144  Second, the Treasury Blueprint 
recommends that the SEC mimic the CFTC’s core principles applicable to 
contract markets and clearing agencies to apply to securities exchanges and 
clearing agencies.145  Third, the Treasury Blueprint encourages greater 
delegation of regulation to self-regulatory organizations.146  It applauds 
current rulemaking by those organizations in the futures context and urges 
that the same be intensified for the securities context, especially by SEC 
delegation to stock exchanges along with swift and deferential approval of 
stock-exchange proposals.147 
The Treasury Blueprint identifies multiple substantive topics on which 
current federal securities and futures regulation differ and suggests that 
these be harmonized, mainly by shifting from the SEC’s mandatory, rule 
orientation and toward the CFTC’s enabling, principles orientation.148  
Doing so, the Treasury Blueprint says, will “enhance investor protection, 
market integrity, market and product innovation, industry competiveness, 
and international regulatory dialogue.”149  A brief review of some of these 
topics supports the inference that the proposed federal consolidated and 
delegated structure would be vastly more enabling, principles-like, 
supervisory, and deferential than the existing system of securities 
regulation—and potentially even more relaxed than prevailing substantive 
corporation law produced by states. 
First, consider broker-dealer regulation.  Although federal securities 
regulation has substantially, yet selectively, preempted many state laws in 
this field, most of these laws derive from principles that predate federal 
securities acts.150  These range from licensing to recordkeeping and capital 
 
 142 See id. at 11–12, 115–18. 
 143 Id. at 11–12. 
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 147 See id. at 111–13. 
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adequacy, to basic common-law principles of fair dealing.151  As adapted 
into federal law, most of these regulations tend to be mandatory and rule-
like.  Examples include the extensively delineated duty of fair dealing with 
customers152 and duties on firms to supervise employees.153  Federal law 
imposes no such explicit requirements on futures intermediaries, although 
the industry’s self-regulatory organization, the National Futures 
Association, sets kindred principles for members.154  The Treasury 
Department recommends moving securities law from its mandatory, rules-
orientation towards the futures law approach, a recommendation embracing 
an enabling, principles-oriented character.155 
Second, consider insider trading laws, which prohibit trading while in 
possession of material, nonpublic information when occupying some 
capacity of trust or other special relationship.156  As applied to corporate 
officers and directors, these laws derive from state corporate fiduciary duty 
principles and become a federal violation when coupled with the antifraud 
provisions of federal securities statutes.157  The SEC accelerated 
federalization of these laws in the mid-1980s in an enforcement campaign 
that some opponents of federal business regulation considered too vigorous 
or ad hoc.158 
In contrast, the scope and level of legal prohibitions and risks of 
insider trading in futures are narrower.  A wide swath of futures markets 
involves contracts that are not susceptible to insider trading.  The Treasury 
Blueprint notes that insider trading “prohibitions under the securities laws, 
and the penalties applied, are generally considered to be much more 
stringent and extensive.”159  It implicitly but clearly endorses relaxing those 
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securities laws in favor of the approach taken in futures regulation.160  This 
likewise provides a basis for imagining a federal corporation and securities 
law more akin to traditional state corporation law. 
Finally, consider private litigation.  Investors in securities who have 
been defrauded are generally entitled to sue primary culpable actors.  These 
rights of action have developed principally by decisional law of judges, 
implying such private rights of action from the broad antifraud principles of 
federal securities statutes.161  The Treasury Blueprint notes that such 
investor rights to sue “may generally be more available under the securities 
laws than under [futures laws].”162  The Treasury Blueprint favors 
harmonizing the two bodies of law along lines of the looser approach of 
futures law rather than securities law.163  Again, this furnishes a basis to 
envision a deregulatory federal corporation law.164 
The foregoing examples—plus the Treasury Blueprint’s listing of a 
dozen such subjects—illustrate a deregulatory approach, more enabling 
than mandatory, and more principles-oriented than rules-oriented, along 
with considerable delegation of regulatory authority from federal agencies 
to self-regulatory organizations.  Although the Treasury Blueprint does not 
directly discuss state corporation law or corporate governance aspects of 
federal securities regulation, its philosophy and logic easily extend to those 
fields.165 
Extending the Treasury Department’s approach yields an interesting 
conception of federalized corporation law.  It offers a novel hybrid 
recasting the competing stances in the decades-long debate, between 
devotees of federal corporation law, who say it is necessary because state 
law is too lax, and supporters of state power, who counter that state law 
production creates competition that promotes superior laws.  Under the 
Treasury Blueprint, federalizing corporation law could occur but would be 
lax and deregulatory.  That is not what many champions of federal 
corporation law traditionally sought, and something more akin to the 
possibilities that Professor Ahdieh suggests are feasible. 
Furthermore, much of federal corporation law production would be 
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delegated to self-regulatory organizations in the private sector, especially to 
stock exchanges.  Stock exchanges would expand the scope of their 
existing listing manuals, which already overlap with many state corporation 
law provisions, to round out the entire subject.166  Similarly, self-regulatory 
organizations could expand their existing mechanisms of dispute 
resolution, including arbitration of broker-investor disputes, to encompass 
disagreements between shareholders and managers traditionally litigated in 
state courts.167  Stock exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations 
would effectively replace states, and competition among them would 
produce alternative approaches to subjects traditionally contained in state 
corporation law. 
Amid globalization, U.S. exchanges would compete not only with each 
other but with all other stock exchanges in the world.  The result would be 
a broader competitive market, extending beyond U.S. states to the world’s 
capital markets.  Federal corporation law would become a product in 
competitive global regulatory markets.  If such regulatory competition is an 
important contributor to laws bearing enabling characteristics, then one 
may expect that resulting federal corporation law would have those 
features.  Certainly, market forces would be a driving engine toward the 
production and characteristics of those laws. 
Another question is whether any initial enabling character of federal 
corporation law, promulgated substantially by stock exchanges and other 
self-regulatory organizations, would be sustainable.  Probing that question 
can be done by putting this hypothesis in the context of the debate 
addressing costs of federal securities-regulation monopoly.  A group of 
scholars, championing state competition in corporation law, object to the 
functional federal monopoly over securities law production, arguing that 
the result can be inefficient laws. 
Curative prescriptions include giving securities issuers the choice of 
applicable laws,168 letting stock exchanges where issuers list make the 
choice,169 or mutual recognition (allowing foreign entities regulated 
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comparably elsewhere access to securities markets without local 
regulation).170  Others observe that stock exchanges may already supply a 
measure of functional competition171 or question the efficacy of such 
choice-of-law models given national variation in other respects.172 
 Issues surrounding the issuer choice debate may warrant revisiting 
amid globalization and technology changes that intensify stock-exchange 
competition and accompanying regulatory oversight.173  These forces have 
resulted in a large increase in the number of physical and jurisdictional 
locations to access capital under alternative securities regulation regimes.  
In the past, the United States, and especially New York, may have been the 
only (or one of very few) places where large enterprises could raise 
significant capital, so that U.S. federal regulation was such a monopoly. 
Now, however, capital can be raised readily in numerous places in the 
world, creating much more regulatory competition than previously 
possible.  Regulatory competition emerges in this world because stock 
exchanges not only facilitate capital formation, but also supply alternative 
legal regimes for issuers and other market participants.174  The Treasury 
Blueprint’s express or implied visions for U.S. corporate regulation175 
would enable U.S. stock exchanges to engage more aggressively in this 
international regulatory competition. 
Current developments, the Treasury Blueprint, and Professor Ahdieh’s 
article begin to coalesce.  Exchanges are competing globally, manifested in 
how they have increasingly combined their operations in various ways, 
ranging from direct investment by one exchange in others, strategic 
alliances like joint ventures, and full mergers.176  The Treasury Blueprint 
imagines U.S. stock exchanges needing to compete in precisely these 
terms.177  It prescribes a relaxed regulatory environment to promote that 
result, identifying federal law as the source with a loose regulatory 
philosophy.178  And that is very much the kind of form that Professor 
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Ahdieh’s article says is feasible.179 
The observation that regulatory monopoly in securities regulation, and 
maybe corporation law, in Washington is diminished amid globalization 
contributes potentially competing implications for Professor Ahdieh’s 
thesis.  If Washington’s command of regulatory power has waned, fears of 
excesses that result from regulatory monopoly may be eased.  Cutting the 
other way, the resulting competition is global, yielding a new form of 
regulatory competition that traditional proponents of federal corporation 
law may greet skeptically.  For them, finding a single transnational 
regulator may be desirable, precisely to establish mandatory regulations.180  
These two competing stances thus suggest renewal of the old race debate in 
a new form, moving from state charter competition to international stock 
exchange listing competition. 
Finally, however, these speculations must confront political reality.  
The Treasury Blueprint is highly deregulatory, enabling, principles-
oriented, and heavily reliant on delegation from federal authorities to self-
regulatory organizations.  When released in March 2008, these 
philosophical views may have enjoyed considerable appeal.  As the entire 
global financial system sailed toward the brink of devastation from then 
into 2009, however, the political mood shifted radically along with it.  
Amid the brewing catastrophe, those seeking regulatory reform may now 
tend to favor tougher regulation, probably meaning mandatory, not 
enabling, provisions and tighter rules, not looser principles. 
If federal corporation law proposals were seriously considered in that 
environment, along with broader proposals concerning financial regulation, 
it seems more likely that the results would bear characteristics akin to 
traditional securities regulation and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act rather than 
characteristics of the Model Business Corporation Act or the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.  Even so, accompanying discourse should 
address matters of institutional design, incorporating a principal point 
crystallized by Professor Ahdieh’s Article. 
 
 179 See supra text accompanying notes 53–58. 
 180 Evidence of this interest appears in a proposal competing with the Treasury 
Blueprint, published by the Group of Thirty.  See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 28, 
at 18, 33–37.  This report prescribes international regulatory coordination to establish order 
in global capital markets rather than to promote U.S. capital market competitiveness, the 
aim of the Treasury Blueprint.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three 
or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 
2009). 
